

Long Paper

The Philippine War, 1899-1902, and the Western Way of War

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## **Introduction**

The Philippine War, 1899-1902, pitted the neo-imperialist United States against Philippine nationalists in a West-East clash featuring a Western nation embodying the classic elements of the Western Way of War, using non-Western Way of War tactics against Eastern nationalist movement. The United States exhibited an adaptability that allowed it to combine conventional Western philosophy, tactics, techniques, and procedures with experience in irregular warfare gained during its fight against Native Americans on the American western frontier to fight first a conventional war then rapidly adjust to an enemy that was forced to fight a guerrilla war. In this fashion, it exemplified the Western Way of War linked to its own ‘manifest destiny.’”

The United States began flexing its extra-continental muscle shortly after realizing its continental “manifest destiny,” from the Atlantic to the Pacific, during the last decade of the nineteenth century. A proponent of “American exceptionalism,”<sup>[1]</sup> John Fiske, wrote an essay titled *Manifest Destiny*. In it he stated, "The work which the English race began when it colonized North America is destined to go on until every land on the earth's surface that is not

already the seat of an old civilization shall become English in its language, in its political habits and traditions, and to a predominant extent in the blood of its people." [2] Sounding like the philosophical underpinning of the Western Way of War, "...Fisk held that the success of the Anglo-Saxon race owed partly to its ... hardiness and partly to its mastery of modern technology.... if the Roman Empire could have possessed that political vitality in all its parts which is secured to the United States by the principles of equal representation and of limited state sovereignty, it might well have defied all the shocks which tribally organized barbarism could ever have directed against it." [3] This drove the United States' extra-continental use of the Western Way of War to grapple with benevolent imperialism.

The United States dabbled in overseas involvement before the war with Spain presented the Philippines as ripe for the taking. Emerging from the Civil War, it took its place as a powerful industrial and commercial nation. "...the Northern business elite, aided...by the political leadership...gave their attention to securing a place for the United States among its commercial rivals that more nearly coincided with the nation's outstanding industrial strength." [4] It forced Japan to open its doors to Western commerce in 1853. It followed Britain into China, [5] enjoying the fruits of its treaties and, on at least eight separate occasions before the Boxer Rebellion landed Marines to enforce treaty rights. [6] A war with Spain would provide the opportunity to establish itself as a global power. Acquiring the Philippines would be an unexpected bonus. Taking the Philippines would secure that country as a market and source of raw material for the burgeoning U.S. industrial base, and serve as a military stepping-stone that would enable greater penetration into Chinese markets. [7]

The Philippine Islands were a Spanish colony since the late 16<sup>th</sup> century. Typically, Spain extracted more from the archipelago than it invested, focusing on oceanic trade at the expense of internal development of the islands. [8] The city of Manila, on the island of Luzon, became the hub of governmental and commercial activity. The countryside was controlled by Spain through their Roman Catholic clergy and a cadre of Filipino "...insular elite, who were confirmed in their local power in return for their acceptance of royal authority." [9] They reinforced the existing multi-layered social structure that was to prove to be a point of vulnerability in the coming East-West clash.

### **The Combatants**

In order to understand the dichotomy of a Western (although not European) army succeeding in a non-Western counterinsurgency environment it is necessary to take a quick look at the U.S. Army's philosophical evolution from conventional Western-Way-of-War army during the Civil War to one intellectually adept at counterinsurgency. This evolution took place during the frontier war against Native Americans from 1866 to 1891. [10] Although forced by exigency rather than contingency (a drastically reduced force structure parsimoniously manned with a demanding mission beyond its capacity to achieve in a conventional manner, an enemy very difficult to identify much less bring into a decisive engagement), nevertheless, the Army's seasoning on the Western frontier was crucial to its success in the Philippines. The Army that evolved from Civil War winner to an expeditionary force that fought, and won, in Cuba and the Philippines was General William Tecumseh Sherman's army. [11]

General Sherman, West Point 1840, is considered the first truly modern general. He was noted for his mastery of the indirect approach, "...attacking lines of communication and resources, and by applying overwhelming combat power at decisive points via strategic envelopment."<sup>[12]</sup> Famous, or infamous (depending upon perspective) for his devastating march through Georgia and South Carolina during the Civil War, his expertise in war-of-attrition focused on denying the enemy's ability to fight by eliminating his logistics base carried over into the conflict against Native Americans on the frontier. Sir Basil H. Liddell Hart considered Sherman a genius in employing the indirect approach,<sup>[13]</sup> which seems to run counter to the Western Way of War focus on decisive engagement with heavy infantry. (A strategic indirect approach can be used to bring about a decisive engagement with heavy infantry at a strategically important time and place, but that is begging the question.)

Replacing General Grant as the Army's senior officer after the former's election to the Presidency, Sherman continued to imprint his personality on the Army. Author and historian Robert Utley writes: "...as Russell Weigley has noted, Sherman was 'one of the most cerebral and innovative' commanding generals in the army's history."<sup>[14]</sup> Not only was he a master of the Western Way of War, he knew how to use other, non-Western Way of War approaches. Sherman's intellectual flexibility, itself a characteristic of the Western Way of War, and his dedication to professionalism imprinted itself on the army; "...he stamped the army with his character and made it peculiarly his own."<sup>[15]</sup> This stamp of intellectual flexibility, used successfully in the American West, was to prove crucial during the Philippine War.

The frontier experience prepared the Regular Army for a counterinsurgency campaign in the Philippines. Robert Utley writes "...for a full century, with brief interludes of foreign and civil war, Indian service was the primary mission of the army."<sup>[16]</sup> "With a conventional force, they tried to control, by conventional military methods, a people that did not behave like conventional enemies and, indeed, quite often were not enemies at all....usually the situation did not call for warfare, merely policing."<sup>[17]</sup> Orthodox military strategies practiced during conventional wars (i.e. the Civil War) had to be modified to include "...the special considerations of the police function."<sup>[18]</sup> Essentially, the greatly downsized post Civil War army morphed into a big police force.<sup>[19]</sup> The basic strategy became one of "...systematic pacification and settlement of frontier areas by advancing lines of forts."<sup>[20]</sup> The successful, albeit clumsy and bloody, "taming" of the frontier provided the army with a proven strategy to use in similar circumstances in the Philippines.

The Revolutionary (Philippine) Army, under the command of General Emilio Aguinaldo y Famy, essentially an infantry force was "...physically tough, inured to hardship, able to move rapidly in difficult terrain, requiring neither extensive logistical lines nor sophisticated equipment...."<sup>[21]</sup> It was organized along conventional lines with line infantry, light infantry, cavalry, and artillery. It was organized in battalions and divisions and had both staff and field officers.<sup>[22]</sup> However, this was where its similarity to other conventional forces stopped. With the exception of a few units consisting of veterans of the Spanish Army, the revolutionary forces remained "...a loose federation of municipal militia, each town having its own band of volunteers who served under their own leaders."<sup>[23]</sup> It lacked any kind of a comprehensive, systematic training program. Its units could not fight together as a coherent entity, lacking the

ability to shoot, move, and communicate in any kind of deliberate, tactically sound manner. It did not have enough modern weapons, relying instead upon captured weapons and ammunition. It had no capacity to manufacture either smokeless powder or high-quality cartridges; they had to be homemade of black powder casting, which greatly limited rates of fire and accuracy.[24] For the most part the officers received their commissions through patronage rather than any kind of tactical or technical competence. They did not attempt to study tactics, drill their troops, or otherwise master the profession of arms.[25] “Often their family and political connections allowed them to disobey orders with relative impunity, and their petty tyrannies and exactions alienated the people they were supposed to protect.”[26]

This, then, was the line-up as both sides girded for the coming conflict. A small, professional army based firmly on the foundation of a Western Way of War, intellectually adept at using non-conventional tactics, techniques, and procedures faced a pseudo-army that would try to employ conventional tactics against its Western foe with disastrous results before switching to a more appropriate guerrilla-style campaign.

## The War

Between 1898 and 1902, 126,468 American soldiers served in the Philippines (although no more than 69,000 at any one time). They fought 2,811 engagements suffering 4,234 killed-in-action and 2,818 wounded. By U.S. count, U.S. forces killed 16,000 Filipinos in battle with another estimated 200,000 civilian deaths by disease, famine, and the ravages of combat.[27] This was the result of America’s “benevolent assimilation.”[28]

The War between Filipinos and Americans was precipitated by the confrontation between the United States and Spain over Cuba. Cubans revolted against Spanish rule. Goaded by classic yellow journalism, Americans reacted against what was presented as Spain’s inhumane actions against the revolutionaries. Catalyzed by the destruction of the USS Maine in Havana Harbor, Congress authorized President William McKinley’s use of military force. On 21 April 1898 Spain and the United States exchanged declarations of war.[29]

The strategy to be used by the United States against Spain included neutralizing the Spanish fleet in the Pacific, based in Manila Bay. Commodore George Dewey, implementing a previously developed contingency plan, sailed his Asiatic squadron into Manila Bay and destroyed the Spanish fleet. As H.W. Brands writes, “For a decade economic expansionists had pointed to the [Philippine] islands as a staging area for the penetration of the China market... [while proponents of Alfred Thayer Mahan’s sea-power advocacy] eagerly eyed Philippine harbors and fuel resources... [which the] fight with Spain... gave these covetous souls an opportunity to grab...”[30] Unable to operate against the Spanish army ashore, Dewey had to await the arrival of U.S. ground forces. When the troops arrived, they “...found themselves facing what was a relatively new feature in Philippine life: the armed forces of Philippine nationalism.”[31]

Filipinos had a long history of animosity toward their Spanish rulers. They revolted a number of times over the three centuries of Spanish rule, none of which really accomplished anything. During the later part of the nineteenth century, a new, more effective national resistance movement developed. This movement comprised primarily educated sons of upper class “Filipino landed elite” (“ilustrados”) returning from abroad where they assimilated

democratic and nationalistic ideals.<sup>[32]</sup> The ilustrados chafed against Spanish rule. The Spanish responded harshly, imprisoning many of these elites, and executing one of the movement's intellectual leaders, precipitating armed resistance against Spain. Emilio Aguinaldo headed the revolutionary organization Katipunan. "The Filipinos by their own military efforts broke the back of Spanish rule...and established an independent and republican form of government...just after Dewey took up his position in Manila Bay."<sup>[33]</sup> (Whether the Filipinos actually "broke the back" of Spanish rule, or had been "...thwarted by Spanish military action"<sup>[34]</sup> is open to debate; for the purpose of this paper, however, this is immaterial.)

On the main island of Luzon, the Katipunan had the Spanish on the run. Driven from the countryside, Spanish colonists were besieged in the capitol city of Manila. Dewey made an informal alliance with Aguinaldo (Dewey's and Aguinaldo's memories of the agreement differ significantly), landing troops in Manila which joined Filipino revolutionaries in the siege of that city.<sup>[35]</sup> Without Aguinaldo's knowledge, Dewey arranged to have the Spaniards remaining in Manila surrender to him after a poorly staged fight, orchestrated to preserve Spanish honor, and keep the Philippine army out of the city. This action fueled growing Filipino suspicions concerning American intentions. The Americans were in the Philippines to stay.

President William McKinley decided to annex the Philippines for two reasons, one ideological, the other interest-based. Acceding to the Kipling's admonition to "Take up the White Man's burden..."<sup>[36]</sup> he considered it the United States' duty to "educate the Filipinos and uplift them and Christianize them,"<sup>[37]</sup> believing them too primitive to rule themselves. From the interest-based perspective, he considered an independent Philippines to be ripe pickings for other colonial powers.<sup>[38]</sup> Tensions built as it became apparent that the United States was determined to establish its dominion over the Philippines. Filipinos wanted independence. With neither side budging from their respective positions, the inevitable clash of civilizations began February 1899. Aguinaldo declared war stating, "I have done everything possible to avoid armed conflict, in the hope of securing our independence through peaceful means and without entailing the costliest sacrifices...all my attempts have proved vain in the face of the unmeasured pride of the American Government and of its representatives in these Islands, who have insisted on considering me a rebel because I defend the sacred interests of my country."<sup>[39]</sup> A vicious fight followed in which the Filipinos suffered heavy casualties (as many as 3,000 killed). The Americans, beset with low troop numbers and the beginning of the rainy season, had to restrict themselves to improving their defensive positions around Manila. They were unable to mount a major offensive until the end of the rainy season in November and the arrival of additional troops.<sup>[40]</sup>

The Philippine War had two distinct phases. The first phase was a conventional war between February and November 1899. Aguinaldo, with his regular army, engaged the Americans in several Western-style battles with decreasing success during this phase. Continuous American reinforcements made each fight more expensive than the last. After the disastrous first battle, the Philippine army conducted a fighting withdrawal to the interior of Luzon. U.S. forces conducted "...a well-coordinated attack across the central Luzon plain..."<sup>[41]</sup> dispersing the Philippine army and almost capturing Aguinaldo. The Americans, with a Western Way of War-conventional mindset, thought each successful engagement was decisive, expecting each to bring an early conclusion of the war. Most of these battles, however, amounted to no more than skirmishes, ambushes, and hit and run attacks, drawing the American forces deeper into the interior, forcing them to disperse taking them further from their logistics base. The somewhat

enigmatic Philippine historian, Luzviminda Francisco (author and historian Max Boot takes exception to some of her assertions, I will not use those in this paper<sup>[42]</sup>) relates one instance when, on 10 June, 1899, in Laguna Luzon, “Filipino Generals Ricarte and Noriel, with 3,000 men, caught an American division of 4,000 in a cross-fire ambush and cut it to pieces.”<sup>[43]</sup> Battles of this size and outcome were rare. Materially, the Philippine army lacked sufficient modern weapons to continue large-scale conventional operations. Only one soldier in three had a rifle. The others fought with bolo knives (a fearsome weapon in its own right), spears, or waited to pick up a rifle from a casualty (Filipino or American). Most of the rifles they did have were top-rate, relatively new Remingtons or Mausers taken from the Spanish or smuggled into the country from abroad, and Krag Jorgensens captured from Americans.<sup>[44]</sup> The lack of success with a conventional campaign against the Americans forced Aguinaldo to disperse his army. “From late 1899 until May 1902, when the last of the insurgents laid down arms, the Filipinos adopted a guerrilla strategy, requiring the Americans to fight a counterinsurgency conflict.”<sup>[45]</sup>

The American Army, at this juncture, reconfigured itself. Initially composed primarily of volunteers anticipating duty in Cuba (with their displeasure at being diverted to the Philippines and the inherent problems with this attitude) it was transitioning to a professional force specifically designed for combat in the Philippines. “Officered and manned by veterans of the Cuban, Puerto Rican, or Philippine campaigns, these regulars [with General Sherman’s imprint] were tough and capable soldiers...[who] arrived in the archipelago skilled in the skirmishing tactics, march discipline, and marksmanship necessary to fighting a guerrilla war.”<sup>[46]</sup>

With new forces available, the U.S. Army went back on the offensive in November 1899 with a three-axis attack aimed at the Philippine army in northern Luzon. One column pinned down the Filipinos in central Luzon; the second column occupied the mountain passes, cutting off any retreat to the east; the third column conducted an amphibious landing at Lingayen Gulf to block Filipino retreat further north. Caught in this three-way vice the Philippine army broke up, losing their supplies, artillery, and some of their more prominent leaders. By the end of 1899, the American army occupied most of the populated areas north of Manila.<sup>[47]</sup> The focus of effort then shifted to the south. By January 1900, the Philippine Revolutionary Army was cleared from those provinces. American forays into the southeastern part of Luzon finished neutralizing the Philippine army’s conventional capability; it scattered, commencing guerrilla operations.

The shift in tactical operations from conventional to counterinsurgency saw a revival of tactics, techniques, and procedure from the frontier days in the American West. Understanding the key ingredient in counterinsurgency warfare to be separating the guerrilla from the population, the U.S. Army focused its efforts at pacification (winning hearts and minds), wresting control of the civilian population from the Filipino “insurgents.” The army had not only a military mission but also a “civilizing mission.”<sup>[48]</sup> “The Army was not only to suppress terrorism, guerilla warfare, and brigandage but to prepare the Philippines for colonial government; moreover, this must be accomplished in such a way that Filipinos would be docile, obedient, and grateful subjects.”<sup>[49]</sup> To this end, President McKinley appointed a civilian Philippine Commission to supervise the transition of power from the Army to civilian government.<sup>[50]</sup> From this point on, the struggle devolved into a contest for the allegiance of the Filipino people, stepping further away from the classical Western Way of War.

“The success of the American pacification campaign became apparent...off balance, short of supplies, and in continuous flight from the army, suffering from sickness, hunger, and decreasing popular support, many guerrilla bands lost their will to fight.”[\[51\]](#) By February 1901, a number of important Filipino leaders voluntarily surrendered. In March, Aguinaldo was captured. Army pacification efforts continued, denuding the countryside, and “re-concentrating” the population, leaving the guerrillas nothing with which to sustain themselves. Victory was declared July 1902. The war was won. The Philippines belonged to the United States, even though conflict would continue at various levels of intensity for a very long time afterward.

### **Western Way of War**

Both the Philippine Revolutionary Army and the United States Army exhibited traits of the Western Way of War at various times, with varying degrees of success, during the Philippine War. The Western Way of War, as applied to the Philippine War, was more than just a sum of its parts. While it did include the more salient characteristics of technology, discipline, the preference for decisive engagement with “heavy infantry,” and Western military tradition, it also included the personal traits of individual initiative, egalitarian camaraderie, and sense of personal freedom.[\[52\]](#)

Both the Americans and the Filipinos sought to use technology to their advantage. While the Philippine Army had access to quality rifles, they did not have enough of them to constitute an advantage. The Americans were well equipped with quality weapons, artillery, naval gunfire support (when available), more and better ammunition, and a host of other technologically advanced equipment. “From the very beginning, superior American firepower had a telling effect, and although the Filipino troops bravely stood their ground, weaponry ensured the one-sidedness of the [conventional] conflict.”[\[53\]](#)

The American army had the advantage of disciplined troops. Granted, this discipline was relative, more or less depending upon whether the soldiers were volunteers or the later-introduced regulars. They had an effective chain of command. Units operated as cohesive entities and were well able to shoot, move, and communicate. Orders were obeyed; commanders’ intent followed.

The Philippine army sorely lacked the quality of discipline. They were a group of individuals, brave and resourceful but unable to function effectively as a cohesive unit. Their leaders were officers in name only; a few of them were good, but that was more by chance than design. They owed their commissions to privilege rather than to proficiency. There was neither an effective chain of command nor a coherent, focused strategy. The Filipinos were willing but unable. The Philippine army’s attempt to fight a conventional war, and the results of that attempt, painfully highlighted their deficiency in discipline.

Both sides sought the elusive, decisive engagement--the classic “clash of heavy infantry.” Neither side found it (if it really exists). The American army won practically every conventional battle, but that did not win the war. The Philippine army tried to fight a conventional war, seeking their own decisive engagement. “It was clear that the Filipinos could not hope to survive by fighting on American terms of fixed position, set-piece battles in the classical military tradition...[they] were forced to resort to mobile warfare where their superior knowledge of the terrain and the universal support they enjoyed among the people [challenged by Max Boot] could be utilized to their advantage.”[\[54\]](#)

The Western military tradition was very apparent in the U.S. forces while non-existent in those of the Philippines. Not only was the army structured, disciplined, and trained as a Western army, it had a heritage of military thought that spanned a century of warfare, both conventional and irregular. This gave the Americans an intellectual edge in all respects. It manifested itself in the intellectual flexibility that allowed the American army to adjust its tactics to fit the situation, as evidenced by its transition to an effective counterinsurgency campaign. As Professor Linn notes, “the successful pacification campaign...was the result of counterinsurgency methods and policies that exploited provincial conditions and enemy weaknesses.”<sup>[55]</sup> This intellectual flexibility is, in this writer’s opinion, the key discriminator and advantage of the Western Way of War. It allows the personal traits of individual initiative, egalitarian camaraderie, and sense of personal freedom to be used to full advantage.

Individual initiative, egalitarian camaraderie, and a sense of personal freedom are byproducts of culture, not something that can be decreed or trained into an army. The philosophical foundation of the United States was built upon these characteristics. They were born into its soldiers. It is what set them apart from the rest of the world, if not in substance, then in degree (other Western entities had these traits in varying amounts, but not to the degree they existed in native-born Americans). This built a healthy skepticism into the average soldier, motivating him to challenge that which was not logical. This challenge was, for the most part, neither subordinate nor mutinous. It provided an intellectual capacity to question stupidity and suggest alternatives (within the context of the particular command climate). Perhaps more importantly, it fueled officers’ ability to discern “commander’s intent” (before the term came into vogue) and adjust tactics to dynamic situations. It set the mind free to become the Army’s most dangerous weapon.

### **Conclusion: Significance**

What benefit is it to study the Philippine War, 1899-1902? The Philippine War represents the United States’ first significant foray outside of its continental borders. It sampled imperialism and its ways and means, creating a moral outcry along the way. It showed, from the American perspective, what to expect in a “clash of civilizations” (in addition to what it learned with its own indigenous population). It also tempered the desire for empire. It discovered the limits of “benevolent assimilation.”

The study of the Philippine War is a study in American character. This character combines economic capitalism and Christian-based morality. Capitalism shaped American interests in the economic potential of undeveloped and underdeveloped foreign (for the most part Asian, Caribbean, and Central American) countries. At the same time, it manifested Christian-missionary zeal to export its vision of freedom and democracy to these lands, to “Take up the White Man’s burden...to serve your captives’ need...your new-caught sullen peoples...shall weigh your Gods and you...”<sup>[56]</sup> The confluence of economic-driven, democracy-centered foreign intervention found its genesis in the Philippine War. The American character discovered Americans fight not for empire but for ideals (sort of). As an Israeli counterpart lectured this writer many years ago when discussing the United States’ motivation for Operation Desert Storm, America is the only country in history that sends its soldiers to fight and die in other countries for ideals rather than empire. What was done in the name of possession and civilization

to the Filipinos soured most Americans on this kind of foreign intervention...at least until the Vietnam War.

What can be learned by viewing the war through the filter of the Western Way of War? The Philippine War identifies a hitherto undeveloped corollary of the Western Way of War, that of counterinsurgency (at least within the context of Norwich's Master of Military History studied up to this point). Counterinsurgency as a new element in the Western Way of War reflects the intellectual flexibility to identify and adjust to changing parameters, situations, and environments. Counterinsurgency is not compatible with the decisive-engagement element of the Western Way of War. Effective counterinsurgency takes time and requires patience, which is counter to the impatient desire for the quick, unequivocal conclusion of the war characteristic of the Western Way of War.

Finally, to what extent did the Philippine War, 1899-1902, represent a classic encounter between the Western Way of War, as described by Geoffrey Parker and Victor Davis Hanson, and a non-Western entity? It represented an evolved Western-Way-of-War clash between Western and non-Western combatants. Both sides tried each other's way of war. The West won; the East lost. The Americans successfully modified their innate preference for conventional decisive engagement. They used their flexibility, born of individual initiative and the sense of personal freedom to adjust to the circumstances as the environment evolved. Their Western military tradition allowed them to apply lessons learned in previous conflicts to make the necessary adjustments in tactics, techniques, and procedures to succeed. Discipline enabled the successful transition from a conventional war mindset to one capable of dealing with the fluid, inconsistent, non-decisive nature of irregular warfare. Superior technology and its inherent logistics capability provided the "fuel" that drove the war-machine. For the United States, it was indeed a classic encounter with a non-Western Way of War. For the East, it was a portent of things to come.

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[1] H. W. Brands, *Bound to Empire: The United States and the Philippines*, 1992, <http://www.questia.com/PM.qst?a=o&d=49072561>, 10.

[2] Ibid.

[3] Ibid.

[4] Luzviminda Francisco, "The First Vietnam: The U.S.-Philippine War of 1899-1902," *The Philippines Reader: A History of Colonialism, Neocolonialism, Dictatorship, and Resistance*, ed. Daniel B. Schirmer & Stephen Roskamm Shalom, 1987) <http://www.questia.com/PM.qst?a=o&d=98800474>, 5-6.

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[6] Ibid, 163.

[7] Francisco, *The First Vietnam*, 7.

[8] Brian McAllister Linn, *The U.S. Army and Counterinsurgency in the Philippine War 1899-1902*, 1989) <http://www.questia.com/PM.qst?a=o&d=10575445>, 3.

[9] Ibid.

[10] Robert M. Utley, *Frontier Regulars: The United States Army and the Indian, 1866-1891* (Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 1973).

[11] Ibid, 15.

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[13] Ibid.

[14] Utley, *Frontier Regulars*, 14.

[15] Ibid, 15.

[16] Ibid, 45.

[17] Ibid, 55.

[18] Ibid, 46.

[19] Ibid.

[20] Ibid.

[21] Brian McAllister Linn, *The Philippine War 1899-1902* (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2000), 35.

[22] Ibid.

[23] Ibid.

[24] Ibid.

[25] Ibid, 36.

[26] Ibid.

[27] Max Boot, *The Savage Wars of Peace: Small Wars and the Rise of American Power* (New York, NY: Basic Books [A Member of the Perseus Book Group], 2002), 125.

[28] Ibid, 106.

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[30] Brands, *Bound to Empire*, vi.

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[32] Ibid.

[33] Ibid.

[34] Gates, *The Limits of Power*, 126-128.

[35] Ibid.

[36] Rudyard Kipling, "The White Man's Burden: The United States and the Philippine Islands," in *Rudyard Kipling's Verse*, Definitive Edition (Garden City, NY: Doubleday and Company Inc., 1940), 321.

[37] Timothy K. Deady, "Lessons from a Successful Counterinsurgency: The Philippines, 1899-1902". *Parameters* 35, no. 1 (2005) <http://www.questia.com/PM.qst?a=o&d=5011208610>, 1.

[38] Ibid.

[39] Brands, *Bound to Empire*, 49.

[40] Gates, *The Limits of Power*, 126-128.

[41] Ibid.

[42] Max Boot, "Caveat Emptor," *Contentions*, 10/10 2007, [Commentarymagazine.Com](http://www.commentarymagazine.com) <http://www.commentarymagazine.com/blogs/index.php/boot/1061>.

[43] Francisco, *The First Vietnam*: 5

[44] Ibid, 4.

[45] Brands, *Bound to Empire*, 50.

[46] Linn, *The U.S. Army and Counterinsurgency in the Philippine War*, 14.

[47] Ibid, 15-16.

[48] Ibid, 20.

[49] Ibid.

[50] Ibid.

[51] Gates, *The Limits of Power*, 129-130.

[52] Dr. John T. Broom, Norwich University School of Graduate Studies, Military History Seminar 2, "Doc's Thoughts, Week 1.

[53] Francisco, *The First Vietnam*, 10.

[54] Ibid.

[55] Linn, *The U.S. Army and Counterinsurgency in the Philippine War*, 76.

[56] Kipling, *The White Man's Burden*, 361.