

The Rhodesian COIN Experience

By
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From 1965 to 1980, the Rhodesian government fought a counteinsurgency (COIN) against a pair of communist foes while facing immense international political and economic pressure. Despite incredible military success Rhodesia lost the war. This article will discuss its COIN efforts and the impact of international sanctions on Rhodesia's military and political efforts. Additionally, Rhodesian COIN will be contrasted with Sir Robert Thompson's five principles of COIN.

A bit of background on the Rhodesian situation helps set the stage. Essentially a very independent British colony since the 1800s, by 1965 Rhodesia was populated by a quarter million European settlers and 2.5+ million native Africans.¹ The Rhodesian government made its Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) on 11 November 1965 in response to a number of items but the UDI was primarily intended to keep its minority rule intact.² The UDI immediately provoked economic sanctions by Britain and most of the rest of the world. Several factors prevented the immediate collapse of the Rhodesian economy; for instance, until 1977, the United States allowed Rhodesia to export chrome.³ Additionally, the South Africa government (and Portuguese governed Mozambique until 1975)⁴ ignored the UN sanctions. The Rhodesians also showed great ingenuity in finding substitute products.⁵

The Rhodesians were fighting two opponents simultaneously: the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) and the Zimbabwe African Peoples Union (ZAPU). The ZANU, supported by the Chinese, using Mao Ze Dong's method of guerilla warfare, infiltrated into Rhodesia from Mozambique. The ZAPU, on the other hand, were situated in Zambia and were supported by the USSR. ZAPU concentrated on conventional military tactics and sent few insurgents over the border into Rhodesia. The two communist movements, although both opposed to the Rhodesian government, were not allies and fought each other frequently. Their differences stemmed from loyalty to separate individuals and their origins from different tribes. The fact that China and the USSR, two politically different and hostile nations, supported separate organizations only compounded the problem. This enmity was exploited to good effect by the Rhodesian government throughout the war.⁶

After the UDI one of the worst possible scenarios for Rhodesia would be for the British government to invade the country; however, this was never a true threat for several reasons. First, given the high number of ex-British personnel in the former colony, many with connections to people in Britain, the decision to invade would not appeal to the British public or Parliament, where the Prime Minister held onto a narrow majority.⁷ Additionally, given the close ties between not only the civilians of the country but also between the militaries of both nations, the British faced a very real possibility that their armed forces would refuse the order to invade. (Indeed, the British SAS saluted the Rhodesian SAS when it stood down with a note that stated "farewell in part to a much admired sister unit....Your professionalism and fighting expertise has always been second to none".⁸

There were a number of important Rhodesian military and police units throughout the war. The Selous Scouts (Scouts) are the most recognized today, but there were others, including the Rhodesian SAS, the Rhodesian Air Force (RhAF), the Rhodesian Light Infantry (RLI), the Rhodesian African Riles (RAR), the British South African police force, the Security Force Auxiliaries, and Grey's Scouts.

The Selous Scouts were organized in 1973 to conduct pseudo-operations against the insurgents that had cropped up suddenly during the previous year in Rhodesia.⁹ Eventually the Scouts numbered 1,500 men, about 80 percent of them native Africans.⁹ The Scouts became one of the most feared military units in history, registering 68 percent of the insurgent deaths inside the borders of Rhodesia.¹⁰ The Scouts were created and led by Lt. Col. Ron Reid-Daly, a former SAS trooper with experience in the British Malayan Emergency.¹¹ Their original mission was to collect intelligence, but the Scouts were eventually used for hunter-killer operations, dirty trick operations (framing insurgents for crimes), and direct action missions such as the Scouts' raid on the ZANU camp at Nyadzonya in August of 1976, which killed at least 1,028 guerillas.¹² While the intelligence collected was usually very good, the information was often shared only with the Central Intelligence Organization (CIO) Special Branch with "very little intelligence passed on to the brigade headquarters in whose area it had taken place."¹³

The SAS was an already established institution when the UDI was declared. Many of the men had experience in previous wars with the British and as mentioned above, were a much admired sister unit of the British 22 SAS. With few exceptions, most SAS operations are still clouded by secrecy; however, members who have been published provide a look at the missions that make the SAS name famous and its heritage proud. For example, in October of 1979, 16 SAS members parachuted 200 miles behind enemy lines to destroy a pair of bridges. Once done, they hijacked a van and drove back to a point where the RhAF them picked them up to finish the exfiltration.¹⁴ Other missions followed these lines, focusing on destruction of equipment, the disruption of supply lines, and assassination. On occasion, the SAS were also used very effectively in large numbers as direct action teams.¹⁵

The Rhodesian Air Force numbered six fixed-wing squadrons and one helicopter squadron, with only slightly over 1,000 personnel. The embargo prevented any serious expansion of the RhAF. Support by the South Africans was vital. Starting off with only eight Alouette IIIs, the Rhodesian No 7 squadron eventually had "more than forty helicopters in service in the 1970's, and approximately half of the helicopters and pilots were on attachment from the South African Air Force."¹⁶

The most effective use of Rhodesia's air power during the war by far was the so called "Fire Forces". These consisted mostly of a single Alouette gunship (called a K-Car) and three transport Alouettes (called G-Cars) along with a four-man LRI force in each G-Car to act as a Quick Response Force (QRF).¹⁷ Supporting the Fire Forces were paratroopers dropping from the C-47's of the No 3 squadron or an armed Cessna Lynx¹⁸ or an Aermacchi-Lockheed AL-60 Trojan¹⁹ from the No 6 squadron formed in 1967.²⁰ These tactics resulted in a tremendous 10-to-1 kill ratio, and during the war's final eight months, approximately 1,680 guerillas were killed.²¹

Helicopters were also used during cross border raids, giving the RLI, Scouts, SAS and other units maximum flexibility and range. This flexibility included the ability to infiltrate and exfiltrate quickly. In fact, looking at the RAND data put together by

Hoffman, Taw and Arnold, approximately a third of operations conducted by the SAS used a helicopter at some point.²²

Fixed-wing assets supported more than just the Fire Force operations and consisted of more than just the C-47s used in those raids. Small planes were used as reconnaissance platforms.²³ Bombing missions were carried out by the 1st, 2nd, and 5th squadrons (Hawk Hunters, Vampires, and Canberras respectively). These attacks were almost always conducted with Selous Scouts or the SAS serving as the forward reconnaissance element.²⁴ The fixed-wing airplanes also supported operations conducted by the Scouts and SAS using the C-47s to drop paratroopers behind enemy lines; fixed-wing attack and bomber aircraft were also used for Close Air Support and to destroy insurgent materiel that had escaped the ground forces. Additionally, the RhAF conducted independent air raids against ZANU and ZAPU targets.

Because of UN sanctions and Rhodesian refusal to incorporate native Africans into the government, innovation was the key to Rhodesian 'strategy' (such as it was). An already mentioned, innovation was the Fire Force tactic which evolved into an expanded tactic called a Jumbo Fire Force using 6 helicopters and a greater number of RLI troops toward the end of the war.²⁵ The Scouts were another innovation brought on by the need for better intelligence from the bush. The Rhodesians also built a myriad of mine-resistant vehicles using base parts available to the strapped and import-limited Rhodesian economy.

These mine-resistant vehicles were designed by Rhodesian police engineers who discovered that because of the mine threat, Portuguese troops were essentially reduced to a garrison force that rarely came out of its camps. Several options were explored, such as the Hyena vehicle developed by South Africa. Rhodesia, ever mindful of their limited budget, soon created the Rhino anti-mine vehicle based on a Land Rover chassis. The Leopard, Cougar, Puma, Crocodile, and Kudu were all invented in this time frame as well with the net effect of drastically reducing casualties from insurgent mine-laying activity that occurred mainly in the northeast, where farm land was prevalent and vital to Rhodesia's continued existence.²⁶

Various modifications were made to larger Bedford troop transports, but the Rhodesians discovered that simply partially filling the tires of these vehicles with water was one of the most effective techniques to 'mine-proof' heavier vehicles. The water severely damped the blast effect of mines while reducing the heat signature. As a result, the heavy transports of the Rhodesian Army were hit by 502 mines with a loss of only 44 troopers.²⁷

The most interesting anti-mine vehicle that the Rhodesians produced, however, was the Pookie. Based on a VW engine and body, this very small vehicle did not put sufficient pressure on the road surface to detonate anti-vehicle mines emplaced by the insurgents. This vehicle became so successful that the insurgents refused to plant mines in areas where it was known to be operating, and eventually they specifically targeted the vehicles instead. As a testament to its builder, the 12 ambushes specifically targeted against Pookies resulted in the death of only one operator.²⁸

The military had other problems as well, mainly consisting of the Cordon Sanitaire, the problem of command and control, and the ignored lesson of the US-Vietnam War regarding body count numbers. Another failure of the military was in intelligence, which will be discussed later in the article.

The Cordon Sanitaire (Corsan) was an attempt to utilize the French lesson from Algeria, namely to seal the border to prevent insurgents from coming in and trainees from going out. Unfortunately, this proved to be a failure, despite its eventual ability to force at least some insurgents to go around the Corsan. Started in 1974, the Corsan was supposed to be covered by troops garrisoned bases every 10 kilometers, but due to the manpower shortage throughout the Rhodesian campaign, the Corsan was scaled back to long range patrols.²⁹ (Author's note: There are conflicting accounts of the year the Corsan was started. Bairstow says 1972;³⁰ however, Cilliers says 1974,³¹ and a paper by Rupiah, a professor at the University of Zimbabwe, talks about the “decision in 1973/1974 to engage in mine warfare against guerilla infiltration.”³²

Even these patrols could have been effective had they been supported by helicopters, but again, the limited number of helicopters restricted this use, and the helicopters were eventually almost exclusively reserved for Fire Force missions. Cilliers astutely observes, “There were several major contributing factors [to the Corsan’s failure]: the limited width of the mined strip; the ineffective type of mine used; the effects of the heavy sub-tropical rains on these mines; the placements of the alarms system on the inner fence; and the difficulty encountered in maintaining the minefield.”³³ The other contributing factor to the Corsan’s failure was the Rhodesian inability to maintain it. The Rhodesian Engineers said, “Maintenance was impossible. The (heavy rain) made the minefield more dangerous to breach than to walk over.”³⁴ This simple statement alludes to the ease of simply walking across the Corsan. Even in the Mod Corsan (a much more effective and expensive version of the Corsan that was constructed over approximately 18 kilometers), “Little attention had apparently been given to the problem of maintenance during the planning stage of the obstacle.”³⁵ The Mod Corsan soon fell into disrepair after the engineers who constructed the obstacle were redeployed.³⁶

Command and control was a problem as well. While many of the units worked well together (i.e., the RhAF and the SAS or Scouts), there was little actual coordination between the different areas of Rhodesia. Rhodesia was separated into separate geographical regions based on the major operations that occurred. The war was run by the each region’s Joint Operation Command (JOC) with no overall authority (Operation Hurricane, for example, was in the northeast sector of the country). This lack of coordination was the result of the military's failure to designate a single individual as being in charge of any given military operation. Until 1977 the war rested in the hands of the individual JOCs of each operation (region) where only personal relationships allowed inter-agency cooperation. Finally the position of Commander, Combined Operations (COMOPS) was created, but the ability of the “supermo” was severely limited in practice. Because the COMOPS (General Peter Walls) was never granted central and overall authority, this problem was never actually fixed during the Rhodesian War. The result was a disjointed strategy and policy that lasted until the dissolution of Rhodesia in 1980.³⁷

Despite the just-learned lessons of Vietnam, the newspapers and government orchestrated the war based on the insurgent casualty rate, which gives no real indication as to whether or not the war is being won. Different indicators should have been used to show the progress of the war, such as insurgent attacks inside the borders of Rhodesia, number of contacts with guerilla forces (not kills), and the amount of information given to government forces by villagers along with their geographical location.

The political problems of the Rhodesian COIN policy constituted the main reason for the quick rise in violence during the mid 1970s, the large rise in the insurgent population throughout the 1970s, and the eventual loss of the war. The biggest problem was international condemnation and sanctions imposed because of Rhodesia's minority, white-led government. In addition, there was no sound national strategy to defeat the insurgents, and political coordination between military and other governmental agencies was nearly nonexistent. Other problems arose from the Protective Villages program; the suspicion the Selous Scouts were held under, domestically and internationally; the ineffective use of psychological operations; and finally, and most importantly, failure of the government to use and maintain the initial favor it had with the native population.

The international problems the Rhodesians experienced were the main reason they were forced to the bargaining table and one of the main reasons for their decision to agree to a time-line for a transition of the Rhodesian government to black majority rule. While the Rhodesian government dealt with the economic sanctions extremely well, they did it with the support of Mozambique and South Africa. With the loss of support from Mozambique after its takeover of pro-communist forces, Rhodesia was left with only South Africa for help. Additionally, South Africa was the 'power broker' in the southern section of Africa. As such Rhodesia was at South Africa's mercy. This chokepoint closed down in 1976 after the Nyadzonya raid when South Africa, in response to pressure placed on them by the US. South Africa's intent was to have a moderate black government in charge on their northern border. While the first domestic 'one man, one vote' election did just that, the international community rejected the results despite a 62 percent voter turn-out.³⁸ With the refusal of the world to recognize the Muzorewa win, another election was forced and Robert Mugabe, leader of the ZANU forces, overwhelmingly won the election and has remained in power since with near dictatorial power.

As important as a strategy is in COIN warfare, the Rhodesian government, completely ignoring Robert Thompson's third principle of COIN (see page 18 for a definition of this principle), never established an actual strategy until 1978, far too late for it to be effective. Indeed, had this strategy been implemented as far back as 1974, along with a centralized command and control of the military, Rhodesia may have continued to exist beyond 1980. Instead, the strategy of protecting vital ground, denying ZANU the 'Ground of Tactical Importance', preventing incursions through border patrol, and raiding neighboring countries to disrupt ZANU and ZAPU, failed to make any actual progress in the COIN campaign during the two years it was implemented.³⁹

Coordination problems hampered COIN operations throughout the Rhodesian government. Different organizations did not communicate with each other; if heads of units failed to get along, they simply did not work with each other at all. Cilliers notes, "The intensifying war demanded a more authoritarian command structure with powers over all civilian agencies involved in activities related to security."⁴⁰ Indeed, criticisms of the planning and conducting military raids were often directed at Ken Flowers, the head of the Central Intelligence Organization (CIO). In addition, Cilliers points out that "the smooth functioning of National Joint Operations Centre (NATJOC) was also hindered by personality clashes between the Commissioner of Police, Commander COMOPS, and the Secretary for Internal Affairs."⁴¹ The war, as one writer has phrased it,

“was a war of consensus.”⁴² While there were problems with the intelligence apparatus as well, these will be addressed separately later in this treatise.

The Protective Villages (PVs) program was a disaster from the start. While trying to emulate the Malayan concept, the Rhodesians failed for several reasons. First due to the very quick implementation of the plan, several basic amenities were missing from the villages, including sanitation facilities, fresh water and building materials for new homes.⁴³ Additionally, the PVs were created at a time when most of the villagers being moved were already working with the guerillas. Says Lohman and MacPherson, the villagers had “probably come to some type of arrangement with the local guerrilla cadre. They obviously resented the interruption of their lives and loss of their individual freedom of movement.”⁴⁴ The PVs were a failed concept and never actually helped the COIN effort.

The Scouts were without question the most effective unit in the war. However, problems abounded for Rhodesia when the Scouts, using harsh tactics, became international pariahs. ZANU and ZAPU skillfully exploited the issue in the international press. While many of their claims were never fully or even partially proven, the accusations hurt the Rhodesian government, resulting in international condemnation against Rhodesia and support for the ZANU and ZAPU parties. Security concerns and institutional secrecy prevented the government from publicly defending the Scouts.⁴⁵ Additionally, the Scouts were accused of murders within the Rhodesian native population (with the population believing these accusations, true or not), which led the natives to mistrust the government more and give the insurgents greater support. For example, the spectacularly successful Nyadzonya raid left an enormous number of ZANU insurgents dead but at great cost, including a refugee camp violation investigation by the UN, South Africa pulling their troops and helicopters out of the fight, and a sudden stranglehold on the only import line into Rhodesia from South Africa.⁴⁶

Psychological Operations (psy ops) were also conducted with poor results. The Rhodesian government had to fight a constant uphill battle, considering they were trying to convince a black population that minority white rule was a good thing. Additionally, the executors of Rhodesian psy ops continually forgot who their audience was. Because of this, many messages were confused or dismissed by the natives due to simple oversights. For instance, leaflets were distributed supposedly by a spirit to several villages during the war; however, they were disregarded by the villagers because “spirits were not believed to have access to a printing press.”⁴⁷ Other mistakes with psy ops occurred throughout the war, and the few leaflets that were not rejected by villagers were not nearly enough to turn the tide. The entire Rhodesian government’s attitude concerning psy ops can be summed up with the quote from Minister of Information P.K. can der Byl, “I wanted to step up the use of the bayonet. That’s the most effective propaganda – the bayonet.”⁴⁸

Rhodesia's last political failure was its inability to retain the support of its own population. Although UDI was declared in 1965, the insurgency did not begin in earnest until the early 1970s. ZANU and ZAPU tried to infiltrate units into Rhodesia very early on after the UDI but were halted due to their own inadequacies and good solid police work in Rhodesia. However, given Rhodesian policies, the population was left to be claimed by the insurgents. Other political failures included white minority rule, the issues already mentioned with PVs and the Scouts, and support of ZANU and ZAPU by the

Chinese and the Soviets respectively. While their politics may have made the ending to the confrontation inevitable, the other policies of the Rhodesian government accelerated the final outcome of the COIN campaign no matter the military effort.

Finally, Rhodesia's intelligence failures are stunning. Although some aspects of their intelligence apparatus were outstanding, those were minor in the grand scheme of things once the insurgency started in earnest in 1972. Unfortunately, many problems existed within Rhodesian intelligence operations. The government should have coordinated military and civilian intelligence services, which was not done until 1975.⁴⁹ Even then, the newly-created Directorate of Military Intelligence was not allowed full access to intelligence until late 1978 due to interoffice fighting between it and the CIO.⁵⁰ Additionally, the Army did not use its intelligence apparatus well and staffed it with unwanted flunkies.⁵¹

Directly applying Robert Thompson's principles to the Rhodesian COIN campaign provides a clear understanding why the Rhodesians failed in their efforts. In his book, *Defeating Communist Insurgency*, Thompson introduced his five principles of COIN. These principles are aimed at all insurgences, not just Communist ones, and the book was released in 1966, years before Rhodesia had a major insurgency and only a year after the UDI. Addressing these principles one at a time highlights the obvious reasons for the failure of the Rhodesian COIN campaign.

Thompson's first principle states, "The government must have a clear political aim: to establish and maintain a free, independent and united country which is politically and economically stable and viable."⁵² The Rhodesians did not do this. There was a clear political aim, which was to maintain an independent country which was economically stable and viable, but Rhodesia was based upon a white minority government which did not care whether the rest of the world approved of them or not. Indeed, Hoffman states that "its refusal to recognize the needs of the black population either politically or socially is a clear reflection of the government's least flexible and weakest position."⁵³ Lack of racial consciousness was the biggest problem the Rhodesian government faced but was by no means the only one.

Thompson's next principle states, "The government must function in accordance with the law."⁵⁴ Again, the Rhodesian government violated this principle, this time with the Selous Scouts. While the Scouts may have been one of the premier military units in the world during the 20th century, several Scout units, and multiple personnel, were alleged to have violated the law; both their own civil law and the Geneva Convention. As previously mentioned, in 1976 the Scouts raided a ZANU military camp killing, over 1,000 guerillas. While this was a stunning military success, the camp was registered as a UN refugee camp, and the Scouts set the camp hospital on fire, killing all the patients.⁵⁵ Because of the camp's registration as a refugee camp with the UN, the attack drew international condemnation with "a subcommittee of the UN Human Rights Commission unanimously approving a resolution Aug 30 asking for a full UN investigation of the attack."⁵⁶ The timing of this raid was also especially poor, considering the effects of the Kissinger initiative.⁵⁷ Additionally, the Scouts were accused of breaking the law during their 'validation phase' of pseudo-operations, sometimes killing village members or insurgent contact men. In fact, "this practice had become so common by the end of the war that the Rhodesian Criminal Investigation Department had opened a number of murder dossiers on Selous Scouts and Special Branch members."⁵⁸

Thompson's third principle was, "The government must have an overall plan."⁵⁹ No real synchronized plan was ever in place in Rhodesia. Many tactics and techniques went into Rhodesian COIN warfare, but no real strategy to win the war was in place until 1978, far too late to make any difference. While many of the tactics used gave excellent results militarily, like the Selous Scouts and their pseudo-operations, at no time did all the elements of the Rhodesian security forces actually have an overall plan and work together to defeat the guerillas. Instead, the war was conducted piecemeal via the different Joint Operation Centers (JOCs). This created two problems, both of which Cilliers points out very accurately. First, "Without a viable political objective and at least rudimentary policy guidelines, a vast number of COIN measures become difficult to execute coherently."⁶⁰ Second, "The lack of a unified high level command that could enforce compliance over the total range of COIN activities was a severe limitation."⁶¹ Both of these problems hampered the COIN effort in Rhodesia. While the other Thompson principles were violated, none were as badly so as this one.

Thompson's fourth principle concentrated on the political. "The government must give priority to defeating the political subversion, not the guerrillas," Thompson wrote.⁶³ Again, the government failed in this aspect of COIN for a variety of reasons. Due to their white supremacist beliefs, they were unable to integrate blacks into wider Rhodesian society, thus depriving them of a stake in the survival of their own government. Because of this, compounded by the fact that the white government did not believe blacks capable of holding government jobs, the Rhodesians overemphasized military operations to defeat the guerrillas. While this may have been one of the most successful military campaigns of the 20th century, Thomas Arbuckle addressed the problem very well, stating that the Rhodesian military (and government) "failed to realize that the war is essentially political rather than military."⁶²

Thompson's last principle says, "In the guerrilla phase of an insurgency, a government must secure its base areas first."⁶³ Paradoxically, the Rhodesians managed to follow this principle yet fail at it at the same time. While Rhodesian military bases, major cities, and even select areas of the countryside were relatively safe, other portions of the population were not protected or secured at all. Rhodesia conducted the protected village program but did not conduct it like the US Marines' CORDS program in Vietnam or follow the example of Malaya, where Templer "focused on expanding 'oil spots' of security"⁶⁴ Instead, despite the official statement that the intention of the PVs was "to deprive terrorists [insurgents] of their vital contact with the civilian population," the PVs were simply a place to dump the native population away from their original villages, creating a depopulated area where Security Forces could conduct unlimited operations against infiltrators.⁶⁷ The fact that this program removed the villagers from insurgent control was secondary and only temporary; insurgents quickly regained control of villagers via government programs in these PVs, such as food rationing, curfews, and the small amount of security given. Hoffman even points out in his RAND paper, *Lessons for Contemporary Counterinsurgencies*, that "the Rhodesian military's tendency to treat civic action as an adjunct or afterthought and not as an integral part of the COIN campaign irrevocably undermined any prospect of success."⁶⁵ While these villages partly fall under the previous principle (political subversion), it was these population centers that caused a large part of the Rhodesian COIN program to fail.

The most confusing part of Rhodesia's COIN strategy is that it was executed haphazardly from 1972 onward. Given the chronology, it is amazing that almost no lessons were learned from two recent, earlier wars. The Vietnam War was ending when the Rhodesian insurgency flared up, and Robert Thompson had already released his book in 1966 giving his principles of COIN. David Galula had already been recognized as a COIN expert and released all of his works. In addition to all this, the Rhodesian military had many members who served with the British in Malaya and had firsthand knowledge and observation of a successful counterinsurgency! Given all of these factors, none of the lessons learned over the past several decades were fully or accurately applied in Rhodesia, the result being a lost war. Some of these lessons were learned academically, even if not physically applied, given that the Rhodesian COIN manual states, "Unless the trust, confidence and respect of the people are won by the government and the military forces, the chance of success is greatly reduced."⁶⁶

While Rhodesia did have a minority-led governmental policy (a clear violation of the free, independent and united country principle), the rest of Thompson's philosophies could have been followed. This, along with a substantial psychological campaign to show the higher standard of living that most blacks in the country had compared to the rest of Africa and the amazing military successes the Rhodesian had, in all probability would have allowed Rhodesia to exist for years longer than it did. Indeed, had Rhodesia lasted longer, South Africa's apartheid regime would probably have lasted longer as well, given the two countries existed next to each other and could have supported each other, even with the UN sanctions against them both. Unfortunately, the horrible conclusion to the Rhodesian war was the election of Mugabe, who still holds office as of 2010 with a staggering 80 percent unemployment rate, an inflation rate of 24,000 percent, and minority whites still owning much of the land.⁶⁷

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¹ JRT Wood, *Rhodesian Insurgency*, part 1, 2.

² JK Cilliers, *Counter-Insurgency in Rhodesia*, (London: Croom Helm Ltd., 1985), 4.

³ Lester A Sobel, ed., *Rhodesia/Zimbabwe 1971-177* (New York: Facts on File, 1978), 137.

⁴ CIA, 2008. *Central Intelligence Agency: The World Factbook: Mozambique*. Langley, Virginia: CIA. On-Line. Available from Internet <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/mz.html#Intro>, accessed 3 May 2008.

⁵ Bobby Ray Pinkston, *The Rhodesian Insurgency: A Failure of Regional Politics*, (Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania: US Army War College, 2005), 7.

⁶ Cilliers, 4-6.

⁷ Charles M Lohman and Robert I MacPherson, *Rhodesia: Tactical Victory, Strategic Defeat*, (Quantico, Virginia: Marine Corps Command and Staff College, 1983), 12.

⁸ Melson, *Top Secret War: Rhodesian Special Operations, 1965-1980*, (post 2003), 31.

⁹ Chris Vermaak, *Rhodesia's Selous Scouts*, (1977) 5.

¹⁰ Cilliers, 132.

¹¹ James S Corum and Wray R Johnson, *Airpower in Small Wars*, (Kansas: University of Kansas Press, 2003), 296.

¹² Lawrence E. Cline, *Pseudo Operations and Counterinsurgency: Lessons from other Countries*, (Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania: US Army War College, 2005), 89.

¹³ Cilliers 133.

¹⁴ Bruce Hoffman, Jennifer M Taw, and David Arnold, *Lessons for Contemporary Counterinsurgencies; The Rhodesian Experience*, (Santa Monica, California: RAND Corp, 1991), 86.

¹⁵ Ibid, 82.

¹⁶ Corum and Johnson, 297.

¹⁷ JRT Wood, *Fire Force Warfare in Rhodesia*, Part 1, 15.

¹⁸ Corum and Johnson, 298.

¹⁹ Hoffman, Taw, and Arnold, 22.

²⁰ Corum and Johnson, 296.

²¹ JRT Wood, *Fire Force*, part 1, 21.

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- ²² Hoffman, Taw, and Arnold, 79-87.
- ²³ Corum and Johnson, 299.
- ²⁴ Ibid, 296, 301.
- ²⁵ Hoffman, Taw, and Arnold, 22.
- ²⁶ Ibid, 62-71.
- ²⁷ Ibid, 65.
- ²⁸ Ibid, 72, 74.
- ²⁹ Timothy M Bairstow, *Border Interdiction in Counterinsurgency: A Look at Algeria, Rhodesia, and Iraq*, (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: US Army Command and General Staff College, 2006), 46.
- ³⁰ Bairstow, 46.
- ³¹ Cilliers, 105.
- ³² Martin R. Rupiah, *A Historical Study of Landmines in Zimbabwe, 1963-1995*, (Zimbabwe: University of Zimbabwe, 1995) 68.
- ³³ Cilliers, 107.
- ³⁴ Ibid, 108.
- ³⁵ Ibid, 110.
- ³⁶ Ibid, 110.
- ³⁷ Ibid, 60-68.
- ³⁸ JRT Wood, *Rhodesian Insurgency*, part 2, 6.
- ³⁹ Wood, *Rhodesian Insurgency*, part 2, 5.
- ⁴⁰ Cilliers, 66.
- ⁴¹ Ibid, 73.
- ⁴² Lohman and MacPherson, 54.
- ⁴³ Cilliers 85.
- ⁴⁴ Lohman and MacPherson, 37.
- ⁴⁵ Vermaak, 3.
- ⁴⁶ Cilliers, 32.
- ⁴⁷ Ibid, 167.
- ⁴⁸ Ibid, 142, quoting Julia Fredrikse, *None but Ourselves: Masses vs the Media in the Making of Zimbabwe*, (Johannesburg: Raven Press, 1982),126.
- ⁴⁹ Ibid, 224.
- ⁵⁰ Ibid, 227.
- ⁵¹ Ibid, 223-224.
- ⁵² Robert Thompson, *Defeating Communist Insurgency*, (St Petersburg, Florida: Hailer Publishing, 2005), 50-51.
- ⁵³ Hoffman, Law, and Arnold, 42.
- ⁵⁴ Thompson, 52.
- ⁵⁵ Cline, 12.
- ⁵⁶ Sobel, 80.
- ⁵⁷ Cilliers, 67.
- ⁵⁸ ibid, 128-129.
- ⁵⁹ Thompson, 55.
- ⁶⁰ Cilliers, 77.
- ⁶¹ ibid, 77.
- ⁶² Cilliers, 244, quoting T Arbuckle *Rhodesian Bush War Strategies and Tactics: an Assessment*, (RUSI Journal; Dec 1979), vol 124, no 4, 32.
- ⁶³ Thompson, 57.
- ⁶⁴ John Nagl, *Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam*, (Chicago; University of Chicago Press, 2002), 98.
- ⁶⁵ Hoffman, Taw, and Arnold, 25.
- ⁶⁶ *Rhodesian Security Forces COIN Manual*, (June, 1975), 4.
- ⁶⁷ CNN. 2008. *Embattled Mugabe boosts workers' pay*. On-Line. Available from Internet <http://www.cnn.com/2008/WORLD/africa/03/12/zimbabwe/>, accessed 19 May 2008.