

***The Long March:
Mao's Rise to Power
1934-1935***



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***Presented to
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MS691 C001 Win 07***

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The Long March: Mao's Rise to Power

Rules of guerilla warfare, Mao Zedong, The Long March

If the enemy advances, we retreat.

If the enemy halts and encamps, we harass.

If the enemy seeks to avoid battle, we attack.

If the enemy retreats, we pursue.




Figure 1 – by the author, December 23, 2006

Certain historic events tend to define a nation, creating a mythology that reflects a perceived ideal. Over time, scholars, storytellers, or the vanities of the victorious embellish the telling until the story becomes part of a creative history. The United States has experienced these events, such as Washington's crossing of the Delaware, the midnight ride of Paul Revere, and Dr. Martin Luther King's

March on Selma Alabama. The epic “Long March” completed by the Communist People’s Red Army in 1935 is such an event, an event that, even including the inevitable embellishments, has defined the Communist Party of China. This paper will attempt to distill the myriad of Long March tales to arrive at a succinct, understandable, and readable account of one of history’s truly extraordinary military and political achievements. The paper generally follows the accepted history of the march. Yet, there are many who dismiss the march as pure fabrication. For instance, *The Economist Magazine* calls the march, “China’s founding myth.”¹ A recent biography of Mao Zedong by Jung Chang and Jon Halliday tells us that the Long March is “one of the biggest myths of the 20th century.” Chang and Halliday assert, “Mao was borne on a litter throughout the year-long trek and that China’s then ruler, Chiang Kai-shek, made no more than a token effort to stop them.”² Notwithstanding the scholarly work of Chang and Halliday, several billion people accept the story of the march as valid. With the support of any such large belief group, myth assumes the import of fact. So, it is with Mao’s Long March.

From the Long March would come the great early leaders of the Peoples’ Liberation Army (PLA) and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai. The story of their rise to power is the story of bloodshed, sacrifice, political intrigue, and endurance. While it is difficult to pick a single starting point for the Long March story, the events in Shanghai on April 12, 1927 are certainly a galvanizing point in the history of the Chinese Communist movement.



Figure 2. Shanghai in 1920s, from *Post Japanese*, The Takeo Club

On the early morning of April 12, 1927, thousands of thugs from the underworld Green Gangs emerged from Shanghai's thriving International Settlement disguised as workers. These militant members of the Nationalist Party (Kuomintang or KMT), with Chiang Kai-shek leading, attacked Communist Party members with a degree of violence and brutality not equaled since Vlad the Impaler butchered thousands in the 14th Century. The KMT shot many of the communists, but beheaded many others. An unfortunate few met death in the cauldron of a glowing steam locomotive boiler. The KMT performed so many decapitations that the executioners, wielding heavy scimitars, could no longer raise their fatigued arms. Decimated by the savagery, Communist membership dropped to a low of only 10,000.³

This tragic event became known as the "April 12 Antirevolutionary Coup" or "The April 12 Tragedy." The killing continued over the next several months, spreading across parts of China allied with Chiang. This widespread, successful suppression of the Communists allowed Chiang to consolidate his power-hold on China and finally defeat the warlord contingents that had dominated China for thousands of years. The battered Communists were compelled to seek collective security away from the urban areas of Shanghai and Beijing.⁴

A very few, including Zhou Enlai (Premier of the People's Republic of China from 1949 until his death.) escaped to Jiangxi and Hunan Provinces, whose rugged remoteness offered a safe haven for the fugitive CCP members. Other strongholds were in Sichuan and Shaanxi Provinces.

Jianxi was the Wild West of China. Narrow, treacherous mountain paths served a land that had no roads. Impoverished peasants traversed these trails carrying burdens on their backs, and mule trains lumbered in single file where clearances were too narrow for even the smallest of carts. This forsaken land bore the trademarks of primitive peoples all over the world--illiteracy, disease, poverty, and ignorance. What better place for the birth of an ideology that is dependent upon blind obedience?

CCP Grows in Strength

In their rugged mountain sanctuaries, the CCP received support from the Soviet Union not only in material form, but also in the form of advisors such as Otto Braun. Braun was, of all things, a German Communist representing the Communist International, the Comintern. Braun--he took the Chinese name Li De--had no particular military expertise yet he came to lead the Red Army along with Bo Gu--a Moscow trained Chinese--and Zhou Enlai. At this time, Mao had not assumed a major leadership role, had yet to gain influence.

For seven years, the CCP grew in numbers and strength--more than enough to pose a significant threat to Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalist Party. That meant, in Chiang Kai-shek's mind--that he had to eliminate the CCP. Chiang Kai-shek conducted a series of numbered annihilation campaigns against the

“Red Bandits” as he called them. The First, Second, Third, Fourth and Fifth Campaigns were embarrassing defeats for the KMT. The CCP proved hard to catch; they instituted a never-ending series of “hit and run” strikes that lulled the KMT deep into Communist territory where the Communists would spring traps to defeat their enemy. Using these tactics, the CCP amassed a huge cache of weapons and replaced their losses from the thousands of KMT prisoners who preferred Communism to death. These Communist wins worried Nazi Germany, already paranoid concerning the emerging Communists force in China. Since armed intervention would have stretched precious German assets, Hitler sent advisors to strengthen KMT tactics.

German Advisors Turn the Tide

In the Fifth Campaign, the German advisor, General Hans von Seeckt, introduced “Blockhouse Warfare.” Adoption of von Seeckt’s tactics allowed the KMT to advance in a less chaotic and more methodic German fashion. As Chiang’s forces marched, they stopped at regular intervals to build blockhouses and pillboxes, as many as 3,000 in a year. These structures allowed the KMT Red Army slowly, but surely, to tighten a secure noose around the “Red” CCP throat. Instead of hit-and-run battles, the CCP now found that they must meet the KMT head on—the effects were miraculous from Chiang’s perspective. Chiang’s confidence grew after so many years of steady losses. He now ventured to predict that the end was near for the Red Bandits. He was wrong.

The March Begins

By the first of 1934, the CCP had sustained losses of close to 60,000 and by fall, the Communists had lost 58% of their remote territory. They had to leave or face complete annihilation. On October 16, 1934, they fled not knowing where they were going. With an amazing strength of over 86,000 men and women, the CCP began a treacherous journey that would last more than a year, ending October 19, 1935.

The Long March was actually comprised of three marches completed by three CCP armies. Mao would eventually lead the First Red Army from Jiangxi, Zhang Goutao would lead the Fourth Army from Hubei, and He Long would lead the Second Red Army from the western part of Hubei.

During the years in hiding, the Red Armies had amassed a huge cache of arms—captured during engagements with the KMT. The CCP had 33,243 rifles, carbines, pistols, submachine guns, light machine guns, and heavy machine guns as well as 38 mortars. They had almost 2 million cartridges, 3,500 mortar shells, and 77,000 hand grenades.⁵

Future Chinese Communist Leaders Emerge

The march would come to define the fledgling party and provide it with its future leadership-- Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai, Deng Xiaoping, Zhu De, Peng Dehuai (leading the Third Army Group), Lin Biao (leading the First Army Group), Nie Rongzhen (political commissar of the First Front Army), Liu Bocheng, and Ye Jianying. The party would promote Zhu, Peng, Lin, Nie, Liu, and Ye to the rank of Marshal in 1955.

The crossing of the Xiang River was the first major battle and almost proved to be the end of the CCP march. Fought for a week—November 25 through December 3—the Red Army lost over 50,000 men, leaving them with roughly 30,000 troops. Poor march organization, under the inexperienced leadership of Li De (Otto Braun), contributed to the loss. The CCP's own disorganized, gangling rear guard—made up of peasant porters--was strangling the main march.

The Red Army enlisted peasant porters to carry equipment and supplies. This dangling anchor of humanity stretched for up to fifty miles. As the unorganized mass reached the Xiang and encountered difficulty, the bewildered peasants threw much of the CCP's hard-won equipment in the river. This proved the undoing of Li De and provided an opening for Mao Zedong.

The Forgotten Women of the Long March

In their book, "Women of the Long March," Lily Xiao Hong Lee and Sue Wiles remind us that Chinese history tends to obscure the contributions of women. Such it is with the Long March. Lee and Wiley tell us that thirty women began the march and only nineteen finished. Their experiences were often tragic and heartbreaking.⁶

Women such as Kang Keqing—known as the "Red Amazon" or "The Girl Commander"—rose to high positions in the CCP. Others, such as Mao's second wife, He Zizhen, faded to obscurity. He Zizhen was pregnant as the march began. Her position as Mao's wife made staying behind too dangerous. Like many women, she gave birth under horrific circumstances during the march.

Making her experience more tragic, the rigors of the march forced her to leave her baby on the trail in the hopes that someone would pick it up. She suffered mental disorders for the rest of her life and faced exile in Russia at the hand of Jiang Qing, Mao's politically powerful third wife.⁷

The Zunyi Conference

When the badly mauled Red Army captured Zunyi in northern Guizhou—early 1935—it stopped for a conference that would forever shape China's history and that would have a profound impact on the history of the world. Otto Braun's poor leadership performance gave Mao Zedong the opening he needed. Mao removed Braun as the Red Army leader and assumed the leadership role he would hold for the rest of his life.

Historians have steeped the Zunyi Conference in controversy with arguments relating to Mao's power before and after. Nevertheless, one can readily trace the demise of strict Soviet control over the CCP to the Zunyi Conference. Before Zunyi, the Twenty-Eight Bolsheviks—Soviet trained leaders—had composed CCP leadership positions. These pre-Zunyi, Comintern leaders were men who believed that revolutions in China should be urban based. They had little faith in Mao's guerrilla warfare tactics drawn from a rural base.⁸



Mao began by changing the Red Army march strategy. The Braun plan had called for a march to the north to join with He Long's Second Army group. They would cross the Yangzi River jointly. Intelligence sources reported the KMT were waiting at the Yangzi with over 400,000 troops. Including recent additions, Mao had only 35,000 Red Army troops with which to face this formidable force.

Mao, therefore, changed course doubling back to the south and west to the Loushan Pass.

The Red Army was to win its first major victory of the Long March at Loushan Pass, inspiring Mao Zedong to write one of several poems about the journey.

Notice the not-so-subtle symbolism in the last phrase.

The Loushan Pass

Figure 3⁹Figure 4¹⁰

(Note: The author found numerous versions (interpretations) of this famous Mao poem. The one printed above, in the author's opinion, best fits the Western manner of expression.

The imposing Loushan Pass controlled access to Zunyi and was a vulnerable choke point as can be seen from the photograph (Figure 4.) Fortune favored the Red Army, led by Peng Dehuai, as they gained control of the pass bare minutes ahead of the KMT. The Red Army's tactical advantage, gained by a torturous double time pace which they sustained for two days, resulted in a dramatic defeat of the Nationalist Army—the first of the Long March. In two violent days of fighting, the KMT suffered the devastation of two divisions and

eight regiments. The CCP took 2,000 KMT soldiers prisoner and captured 1,000 rifles along with 100,000 rounds of ammunition.¹¹

The River Wu Crossing

The KMT disaster continued at the River Wu crossing--the Wu is a tributary of the Yangtze River, flowing through the staggering hills of western Kweichow Province. KMT General Wi Qiwei found disaster at the Wu as the Red Army attacked him. His forces were foolishly split on both sides of the river. The general suffered the humiliation of having 1,800 of his men surrender along with their weapons. To make matters worse, 800 of the captured men transferred allegiance to the Red Army.

Convincing KMT soldiers to renounce the Red Army was crucial to Mao's success since the KMT held such an overwhelming numerical superiority. To Mao's disadvantage, the arduous journey took a constant toll on Red Army strength. It was not merely battle that sapped the strength of Mao's army. Primitive conditions, meager rations, the lack of medical support, and rampant disease left thousands falling by the wayside from disease and exhaustion. After the march, a KMT artillery leader said, "Each man carried five pounds of ration rice and each had a shoulder pole from which hung either two small boxes of ammunition or hand grenades, or big kerosene cans filled with our most essential machinery and tools. Each pack contained a blanket or quilt, one quilted winter uniform, and three pairs of strong cloth shoes with thick rope soles tipped and heeled with metal."¹²

Down to as few as 20,000 men against a KMT Army estimated at between 500,000 and 750,000 men, Mao found it necessary to use diversionary tactics. Mao devised march lines that were seemingly in total disarray, or so it must have seemed to Chiang Kai-shek as he tried to conduct concentrated attacks. Nevertheless, Mao was not a leader to conduct affairs in disarray; he kept the central thrust of the Red Army pointed toward that critical crossing of the Yangzi. The Golden Sands River, a tributary of the Yangzi, was that point.

The Luding Bridge

Badly outnumbered, Mao had to avoid massive contact, putting water barriers between his Red Army and Chiang's Nationalist Army was a most effective way of doing this. The Bridge at Luding presented such an opportunity so Mao raced for the historic structure. Built in 1701, the bridge was 100 meters long and 2.8 meters wide. Thirteen chains supported the old bridge.

Racing for the bridge in a two-day sprint against the KMT, Mao had his men leave behind everything except their rifles and ammunition. They arrived first and began deceptive tactics from the far side. In a masterful deceptive move, the Red Army mimicked KMT bugle calls (there were no radios) and convinced KMT forces that the Red Army was actually a KMT allied army firmly in control of the strategic far side. It worked. Mao and his army were able to cross the bridge ahead of the KMT and thereby deny its use.

The crossing at Luding served as a much-needed moral boost for the Red Army and provided positive headlines worldwide. The Communists needed world support in order to entice sympathizer monetary support, and they needed




Figure 5 – Luding Bridge - Noll

to present to the Soviets, their major source of support, an aura of victory. Had Mao not been successful in getting his army across the river, the KMT may well have destroyed the Red Army, and with it, Mao's dream of a Communist empire in China.

There is significant controversy associated with the historic Luding Bridge crossing. While there is no doubt that the Communist crossing of the bridge occurred and that it was a

significant positive media event, some noted historians doubt that it was a battle at all, that it was lightly opposed or even conducted without opposition.

In their book, *Mao: The Unknown Story* (2005, 832 pages),¹³ Jung Chang and Jon Halliday dispute the historical account of the battle. In their eleven years of research, they discovered a witness, Li Xiu-zhen, who said that there had been no fighting at all, that the entire event was Communist propaganda. Other witnesses have corroborated Li's account of the events at the bridge, but the official history stands. Most Asian historians do agree that there was a battle for the bridge even if it was small—less than 20 casualties.

In an effort to validate the findings of Chang and Halliday, *The Sydney Morning Herald* searched for Li Xiu-xhen, but could not find him. They did, however, find an 85-year old eyewitness, Li Guixu, who was 15-years old at the time of the crossing.¹⁴ He also disputed the official Red Army version of the event saying that there had been no battle at all. Deng Xiaoping—a Long March veteran leader and acting People's Republic of China Chairman (1977-1989)—unofficially shed some light on the subject.

According to former United States National Security Advisor, Zbigniew Brzezinski, Deng Xiaoping commented to him that the CCP captured the Luding Bridge without significant effort and that the Communists had dramatized the event for media propaganda purposes. As Brzezinski recalls the conversation, Deng smiled and said, "Well, that's the way it's presented in our propaganda. We needed that to express the fighting spirit of our forces. In fact, it was a very easy military operation."¹⁵

The Great Snowy Mountains




Figure 7 – The Great Snowy Mountain¹⁶

Having accomplished the critical crossing at Luding, the marchers might have drawn a sign of relief, but comfort was still far in the future and they now faced their most difficult trial. The next obstacle was one remembered with terror by the few survivors. It was the crossing of the Great Snowy Mountains in the Kunlun Range. This memorable feat would cost thousands of lives and leave thousands more maimed for life.

The 14,000 - 15,000-foot height would kill many men who would die from the extreme exertion under conditions of low oxygen. Halting at the top proved to be fatal. It was terrible not to rest, but rest meant certain, frozen death. The best way down was merely to sit down and slide, letting the ice take you to the bottom. Some were lost, catapulted off cliffs, other suffered broken bones, but many survived. To most of the Red Army, the Snowy Mountain march was the

worst experience of the Long March. One marcher wrote of the Great Snowy Mountains,

“Chiachinshan is blanketed in eternal snow. There are great glaciers in its chasms and everything is white and silent. We were heavily burdened because each man had to carry enough food and fuel to last ten days. Our food was anything we could buy -- chiefly corn, though we had a little buckwheat and some peppers. We carried our food in long cloth pouches over our shoulders. General Chu carried his food like everyone else. He had a horse but he gave it to sick or wounded men to ride.”¹⁷

Kunlun
by Mao Zedong 1935

*Towering aloft
Above the earth
Great Kunlun
You have witnessed all that was fairest
In the human world
As they fly across the sky, the three million
dragons Of white jade
Freeze you with piercing cold
In the days of summer
Your melting torrents
Fill streams and rivers till they overflow
Changing men
Into fish and turtles
What man can pass judgment
On all the good and evil
You have done
These thousand autumns?
But today
I say to you, Kunlun
You don't need your great height
You don't need all that snow!
If I could lean on the sky
I would draw my sword
And cut you in three pieces
One I would send to Europe
One to America
And one we would keep in China.
Thus would a great peace
Reign through the world*

Figure 6 *Kunlun* Poem by Mao Zedong ¹⁸

Mao Meets With Zhang Guotao

On June 24, 1935, Mao and his beleaguered troops arrived at the town of Lianghekou to meet with Zhang Guotao, the commander of the Fourth Front Army. For five years, Zhang had been in the field establishing a series of base areas. There were questions about the size of the respective forces. Zhang had about 100,000 troops, but both were exaggerating their forces. Zhang had approximately eighty thousand combat troops and perhaps seventy thousand non-combat personnel. Mao, however, had exaggerated to an even greater extent--he had only about 10,000 troops. Wisely, Mao had dispersed his troops so Zhang could not know the exact number, but it was obvious that he outnumbered Mao greatly. Friction soon developed. Mao had sent Peng Dehuai of the Third Army and Lin Biao of the First off in different directions. Perhaps he did not trust Zhang, but he was taking precautions. A great celebration took place with cordial outward appearances. It was all a fabrication, fore underneath, and not far underneath, there ran a current of bitterness, hostility and suspicion¹⁹. Zhang was certainly a commander of great skill, but independent nature. Mao seems to have allowed Zhang to digress along the lines of his own objectives. It is possible that Mao saw Zhang's desire to setup rural bases as a way of pushing him to the side.

The Great Grasslands

The next ordeal occurred as the columns traversed the Great Grasslands of Chinghai--Songpan Plateau near Tibet. The Grasslands were an immense swamp that had rarely seen the imprint of men's feet. During the pleasant

summer months, the lush grasses were perfect for feeding the Tibetan's yaks and horses. It was the eight to nine rainy months that made travel a misery.²⁰

The relentless rain saturated the land turning it into an impenetrable marsh. In August, the land was plagued by hordes of mosquitoes bringing a form of "Black Malaria" that sorely taxed the meager medical supplies available.²¹

The poor plains diet made the marcher's health even worse than they had previously suffered. The decline in health also made them more vulnerable to many diseases that were endemic to the area. Since the grasslands were wet, the peasants could not make fires to cook their vegetables and grain, leading to severe gastronomical distress.²²

As winter approached, the temperatures turned to near freezing and the horrible marsh became much like glue, pulling men, women, animals, and carts into its depth as would quicksand. Mao lost more marchers in the Grasslands than he did crossing the Great Smokey Mountains.²³

The March Ends: Mao's Power is Secure



Figure 9 – Mao Zedong after Long March
Push the speaker button below to hear Chairman Mao Zedong
proclaiming the founding of the People's Republic of China.

 click on link to hear Mao Zedong Mao.au ²⁴

In October 1935, after over 12,500km²⁵ of marching—equivalent to a march from London, through Europe, through Russia, and to the Bering Sea—Mao's army reached Shaanxi Province. Only 8,000 had survived. Zhang's Fourth Red Army followed, but it and its commander had fought too many battles, lost too many men—Zhang would never challenge Mao again. The Second Red Army arrived at Shaanxi on October 22, 1936 for an occasion known in China as the "Union of the Three Armies."

The Long March isolated the Communist Party of China (CPC) from the KMT, allowing it to build its strength. Mao wrote,

“The Long March is a manifesto. It has proclaimed to the world that the Red Army is an army of heroes, while the imperialists and their running dogs, Chiang Kai-shek and his like, are impotent. It has proclaimed their utter failure to encircle, pursue, obstruct and intercept us. The Long March is also a propaganda force. It has announced to some 200 million people in eleven provinces that the road of the Red Army is their only road to liberation.”²⁶

Between 1937 and 1945 (during the Second Sino-Japanese War), the CPC and the KMT formed an alliance. At the end of WWII, the Communist Eight Route Army became the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). It turned on the KMT and drove it to the island of Formosa, later called Taiwan.




Figure 10 - Survivors of the 15,000 km journey ²⁷

Many Asian scholars, such as Henry C. K. Liu, give Mao credit for saving the Chinese Communist movement. In his work, *Mao and Lincoln*, he writes, “Without Mao, the Chinese Communist Party would not have survived the

extermination campaign by the Nationalists. It was Mao who recognized the invincible power of the Chinese peasant.”²⁸

There can scarcely be any doubt that the Long March occurred. There were simply too many people involved and too many historic events recorded. There is also little doubt in Western minds that the story has benefited from the vanities of the victorious--no matter. The telling of the Long March, as chronicled in this paper, reinforces the political mythology of the Communist Party of China, which needs a glorious history as much as any nation. The ultimate impact of the Long March on history, however, is inarguable—Mao emerged from the ordeal as a strong leader of the CPC, positioned to push the KMT into insular exile and China into eventual superpower status.

End Notes

¹ “The Long And Winding Road; China's Long March.(The Long March: The True Story behind the Legendary Journey That Made Mao's China)(The Long March)(Book review)”, *The Economist (US)*, (The New York, Economist Group, April 2006)

² *Ibid.*

³ J.A.G. Roberts, *China: The Complete History*, (Stroud, UK, Sutton Publishing, 2003)

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⁵ *The China Daily*, “The Long March Begins”, www.china.org.cn, 2004. Accessed on June 1, 2007.

⁶ Lily Xiao Hong Lee and Sue Wiles, *Women of the Long March*, (East Melbourne, Allen and Unwin, 1999)

⁷ *Ibid*

⁸ *Bookrags*, <http://www.bookrags.com/history/long-march-ema-03/>, accessed May 2007

⁹ *Loushan Pass Victory* , CRIEnglish.com 2005-3-22, <http://english.cri.cn/2245/2005-3-22/119@218214.htm> cover, accessed on June 1, 2007

¹⁰ Noll, 5

¹¹ Noll, 5

¹² Dick Wilson, *The Long March*, (New York: Viking Press, 1971), p 70

¹³ Paul and Bernice Noll, *China History and Culture*, <http://www.paulnoll.com/China/Long-March/Long-March-history-01.html> Bridge picture , accessed January 2007

¹⁴ Henry C. K. Liu, *Mao and Lincoln, The Great Leap Forward: Not All Bad*, *Asia Times Online*. Accessed on December 23, 2006

¹⁴ Cited by John Gittings in *The Changing Face of China*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2005

¹⁵ *Ibid*

¹⁶ Robert Shaw and Peter Hopkirk, *Peak in the Kunkun Mountain Range, Visits to High Tartary, Yark and and Kashgar*, drawn by Major Strutt from a sketch by R.B. Shaw, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985). PD-Art

¹⁷ Wilson, 177

¹⁸ *Post Japanese, The Opium Files, The Takao Club*, (Taiwan: 2003), <http://www.takaoclub.com/opium/postjapan.htm>, accessed May, 2007

¹⁹ Roberts, 389

²⁰ Wilson, 204

²¹ *New York Times*, 26 January 1935: Sec.I, 10

²² *Ibid*

²³ Noll, 7

²⁴ Mao Zedong, *Mao Zedong's Poems of Shi and Ci*, <http://www.ibiblio.org/ulysses/gec/mao/>, accessed on June 1, 2007. Includes both picture and sound byte.

²⁵ Historians have disputed the distance of 25,000 Li (12,500 miles or 8,000 miles) since the march completion. Mao's biographer, Edgar Snow, in *Red Star Over China*, proposed the 12,500km figure. In 2003, however, Ed Jocelyn and Andrew McEwen—editors of *China Daily*--retraced the route in 384 days. They subsequently estimated the distance as 6,000 km (3,700 miles). The established Chinese media disputes their figure.

²⁶ *Mao Zedong*, "The Characteristics of the Present Political Situation Marking 70th Anniversary of Victory of Red Army's Long March" *Tactics Against Japanese Imperialism*, (Beijing, *PLA Daily*, 2006), www.chinamil.com.cn, accessed on June 1, 2007. Note: Mao Zedong wrote this on December 27, 1935.

²⁷ *Bookrags*.

²⁸ Liu

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